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The adage is that the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) is built on the
principle of mutual trust: the presumption that Member States comply
with fundamental rights save in exceptional circumstances. However, the
very existence of the EAW rests on the proper interpretation and
application of fundamental rights standards, and on sincere cooperation
between judicial authorities.With that in mind, the present article gives a
systemic analysis of the EAW. After outlining the key features of its
functioning, the paper discusses the system of exceptions to surrender:
mandatory and optional grounds for refusal in the EAW Framework
Decision (FD), the fundamental rights exception, and cases of invalidity.
As the EAW is based on automaticity, the exceptions define the traits of its
identity. The article’s conclusions reveal the importance of sincere
cooperation to strengthen mutual trust, with judicial independence as an
essential precondition. The article’s comprehensive assessment offers an
original contribution to the debate about judicial independence in EU
law, the operation of the EAW and its role in the wider context of theUnion
as a legal order.
1. Introduction
In a famous novel, the detective protagonist faces a dilemma. The author of a
most heinous crime, who managed so far to escape justice, dies – it will be
revealed at the end – in a plot at the hand of the persons whose lives had been
shattered by that past foul play. After solving the mystery and identifying the
culprits, the detective must decide whether to offer the local authorities a
credible but false version of what happened and save the perpetrators from
prosecution, or to report the truth. Such a conflict embodies – in a particularly
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comprehensive review of the manuscript. The usual disclaimer applies.
Common Market Law Review 58: 683–718, 2021.
© 2021 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the United Kingdom.
extreme way – philosophical questions around the meaning and operation of
the law: to what extent can legal procedures be overstretched or even ignored
to pursue a different – “strict” – sense of justice? To what extent can the
avoidance of impunity be justified?
In EU law, few measures better encapsulate those quandaries than the EAW.
The EAW FD1 was preceded by attempts to streamline judicial cooperation in
criminal matters between Member States.2 However, the terrorist attack on the
World Trade Centre pushed the instrument to the top of the EU’s policy
priorities and led to the approval of the instruments in just a few months.3 We
have no way of knowing how long it would have taken for it to be adopted,
what it would look like, and what would have been the fate of the EAW had
9/11 never happened. However, it is reasonable to state that the greater
political resolve engendered by the terrorist threat contributed to the set-up of
a mechanism that has drastically changed the landscape of inter-State
cooperation within the EU. That was only the beginning of a story that would
continue through to Brexit4 and the authoritarian reforms of the judiciary in
Poland,5 and that would see the EAW as the catalyst of some fundamental
developments of the EU as a legal order.
The well-known starting point is that the EAW was adopted as an
expression of the principle of mutual recognition, identified as the cornerstone
of judicial cooperation within the EU at the 1999 Tampere Council, and meant
to prevent potential offenders from exploiting free movement for criminal
purposes.6 This objective is now reflected in Article 3(2) TEU, stipulating that
the “Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice
without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in
conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to . . . the prevention and
combating of crime”.7
1. Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender
procedures between Member States, 2002/584/JHA, O.J. 2002, L 190/1.
2. Art. 66 of the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement refers to the
possibility for Member States to extradite their nationals without extradition formalities
(provided the surrendered person agreed before a court and had been informed of their right to
the extradition procedure). Also, the 1996 EU Convention on Extradition between Member
States was aimed at limiting the application of the nationality ban.
3. Leaf, “Mutual recognition in European judicial cooperation: A step too far too soon?
Case study – the European Arrest Warrant”, 10 ELJ (2004), 210.
4. Case C-327/18 PPU, RO, EU:C:2018:733.
5. Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, EU:C:2018:586.
6. Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 Oct. 1999, Presidency Conclusion.
7. For a systemic reconstruction of the concept of the fight against impunity in EU law, and
in relation to mutual recognition specifically, see Mitsilegas, “Conceptualising impunity in the
law of the European Union” in Marin and Montaldo, The Fight Against Impunity in EU Law
(Hart, 2020), pp. 21 et seq.
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The introduction of the EAW met with concerns in terms of fundamental
rights protection, and there was only limited certainty about what was going to
change as compared to the previous system: cooperation was taken away from
the executive and placed entirely in the hands of the judiciary, the principle of
double criminality would no longer apply,8 the prohibition to extradite a
State’s own nationals disappeared, tighter time limits for surrender were
introduced to considerably shorten the overall procedures. The mandatory and
optional grounds for refusal of execution were exhaustively listed in the FD;
possible breaches of fundamental rights was not one of them.9 Based on
mutual recognition, the FD implies that an EAW issued by a judicial authority
in Member State “A” and addressed to the Member State “B” against person
“X”, must be recognized by State “B” automatically unless the specific
grounds for refusal apply. The change in substance has come with a change in
vocabulary. In this context, we speak of “surrender” rather than “extradition”,
of “issuing” and “executing” rather than “requesting” and “requested” States,
of “arrest warrant” rather than “extradition request”.
Once handed over to national authorities, the EAW took on a life of its own
and began interacting with 28 different constitutional systems. As it is an
instrument of EU law, the national dimension(s) in turn unfolded against the
background of the Union’s complex legal architecture. The prominence of the
EAW flows inevitably from the high stakes involved in a streamlined system
of transnational law enforcement, with deprivation of liberty at its core. The
ECJ even enhanced the relevance of the EAW, in that it used the FD to lay the
foundation stones of the Union as a legal order way beyond the specific realm
of judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
After the executing judicial authority (for ease of reading, the term “court”
will also be used in this article) receives an EAW from the issuing authority,
the former may raise doubts as to the interpretation of certain aspects of
execution related to the circumstances of the specific case. For instance,
Article 4(6) FD allows for refusal of execution if the person concerned is
“staying in” the executing State. Supposing the question arose whether that
exception would apply to someone that has lived in the executing Member
State for one year. Asked to solve the legal dilemma, the ECJ “returns” its
interpretation to the referring court, which implements the preliminary ruling
and decides accordingly. Before or after the ECJ has been involved, the
8. The abolition of double criminality concerns, more specifically, a list of 32 areas of
serious crime as per Art. 2(2) EAW FD. For other offences, States are still free to impose a
verification of double criminality along the lines indicated by the ECJ in Case C-289/15, Joszef
Grundza, EU:C:2017:4.
9. It is appropriate to emphasize here that – with slight variance – these are key features of
all EU law instruments of judicial cooperation in criminal matters based on mutual recognition.
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national authorities can – and, in some cases, must – liaise with each other to
exchange information pursuant to the procedures laid down in the EAW FD.10
Dialogue through the preliminary ruling mechanism occurs in all areas of
EU law. However, the dynamic nature of the EAW as a measure built around
institutional interaction makes that dialogue the backbone of the FD. In such a
judicial saga based on triangular cooperation – involving the issuing and
executing courts and the ECJ – the answer of the Court is characterized by a
two-tier (at least) legal analysis. On the one hand, there is the interpretation
given to a specific provision or concept constituting a cog in the EAW
mechanism. On the other hand, that reply is placed in a wider context where
fundamental rights and general principles develop too. Thus, “staying in”
under Article 4(6) EAW FD is defined with the rehabilitative function of
penalties in mind.11 “Deprivation of liberty” under Article 26 FD is addressed
in light of the principle of legality and the right to liberty as stated in Article
49 and 6 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU), respectively.12
While some principles do appear more regularly than others, there is one
unifying factor that links the judgments issued by the ECJ, and that is the
principle of mutual trust. Referred to in the preamble of the EAW as the basis
of the mechanism,13 mutual trust was mentioned in the very first ruling on the
EAW and has since become the centrepiece of the mechanism.14 What is
more, it has forcefully ascended to the status of general principle of EU law.
Rooted in the principles of equality between Member States and sincere
cooperation,15 coupled with solidarity,16 geared towards effectiveness,17
mutual trust in the EAW framework amounts to the rebuttable presumption
that Member States comply with EU law and specifically fundamental
rights.18 The implication is that Member States may not demand a higher level
10. The legal basis for this cooperation is primarily Art. 15 EAW FD.
11. See, inter alia, Case C-66/08, Szymon Kozłowski, EU:C:2008:437; Case C-123/08,
Dominic Wolzenburg, EU:C:2009:616; Case C-42/11, João Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge,
EU:C:2012:517.
12. Case C-294/16 PPU, JZ v. Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź – Śródmieście, EU:C:2016:610.
13. EAW FD, Recital 10: “… a high level of confidence between Member States”.
14. Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad,
EU:C:2007:261, para 57.
15. Art. 4(3) TEU. See Fichera, “Mutual trust in European criminal law”, University of
Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper Series (2009/10), p. 12; Lenaerts, “La vie après l’avis:
Exploring the principle of mutual (yet not blind) trust”, 54 CML Rev. (2017), 805–840.
16. Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW, para 57.
17. Maiani and Migliorini, “One principle to rule them all? Anatomy of mutual trust in the
law of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, 57 CML Rev. (2020), 7–44.
18. For a recent and broader taxonomy of the areas where the challenges of trust will
emerge more prominently in the future, see Mitsilegas, “Trust”, 21 GLJ (2020), 69.
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of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State than
that provided by EU law; nor check whether that other Member State has
actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
EU, save in exceptional circumstances.19
The presumption is justified by the argument that States’ adherence to the
values listed in Article 2 TEU flows directly from their status of EU Member
State.20 As far as the EAW is concerned, the presumption can be rebutted
provided that a two-step test devised by the ECJ is met. The executing court
must refrain from executing the warrant where there is material indicating:
systemic deficiencies in the issuing State concerning the protection of a
fundamental right directly connected to Article 2 TEU; and, the risk that those
deficiencies will affect the person concerned in the specific case.21 The
dialogue between the authorities of the States involved is key to this
evidence-gathering process.22
This understanding of the exceptional circumstances doctrine as a two-step
test has been developed by the ECJ in the specific context of the EAW. Here,
the rebuttal of the presumption of mutual trust serves to refuse execution of the
warrant on the basis of possible fundamental rights violations in the issuing
State.23 Therefore, the “exceptional circumstances doctrine” and
“fundamental rights exception” in the EAW can be used interchangeably, as
the law stands at present. However, such a test is an expression of the broader
case law on the rebuttal of the presumption of mutual trust (at least, in the law
of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice). It is in the interpretation of the
Dublin Regulation that the ECJ allowed, for the first time, a fundamental
rights exception to a mutual trust-based mechanism of inter-State transfer of
persons. InN.S., the ECJ found that an absolute presumption of mutual trust is
incompatible with EU law. Therefore, an asylum seeker should not be
transferred to the Member State identified as responsible for the examination
of the asylum claim according to the criteria laid down in the Dublin
Regulation, if the systemic deficiencies of asylum procedures and reception
19. Opinion 2/13, Accession ECHR, EU:C:2014:2454, paras. 191–192.
20. Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, para 35.
21. Joined Cases C-404 & 659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:198, para
104; Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, para 79.
22. “Evidence” is here used in a technical way. It refers to the material indicating the risk of
fundamental rights breach, rather than the evidence supporting the charge or judgment at the
basis of the EAW. “Evidence” is the term used by the Court as well, when referring to the
information exchanged under Art. 15 EAW FD. See Case C-367/16, Dawid Piotrowski,
EU:C:2018:27, paras. 60–61.
23. One may imagine that the two-step test might apply to judicial cooperation in criminal
matters more broadly.
EAW and judicial independence 687
conditions in that State expose the person to the real risk of inhumane
treatment.24
The ECJ introduced a fundamental rights exception into the EAW
system for the first time in Aranyosi and Căldăraru.25 The exceptional
circumstances doctrine has since then been refined by the ECJ. The two main
arenas involved so far have been the prohibition of inhumane and degrading
treatment26 and the right to an independent tribunal.27 That case law has been
triggered by the deplorable detention conditions in some Member States28 and
the authoritarian reforms of the judiciary perpetrated in Poland by the national
government. This introductory sketch brings to the fore some key features of
the EAW mechanism.
Firstly, the EAW is a system of judicial cooperation in criminal matters
based on automaticity: recognition is the rule, with very little room for
exceptions. That automaticity is built on mutual trust, understood in this
context as the presumption of fundamental rights compliance by Member
States. The presumption of compliance applies because the status of EU
Member State entails adherence to the EU values listed in Article 2 TEU. As
a further corollary, the system of exceptions to execution constitutes a
defining feature of a mechanism based on automaticity.
Secondly, the definition of the EAW system as a form of judicial
cooperation has significant legal implications. Since it constitutes a
24. Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N. S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and
M. E. and others v. RefugeeApplications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and
Law Reform, EU:C:2011:865, paras. 105–108.
25. Although the ECJ has not applied the exceptional circumstances doctrine to asylum and
criminal law cooperation in exactly the same way, there are similarities and cross-references
between its case law in the two areas. Aranyosi and Căldăraru is referred to in Case C-578/16
PPU, C.K. and others, EU:C:2017:127, paras. 59 and 75. There, the Court further clarified that
the prohibition of transfer of an asylum seeker may apply even in the absence of systemic
deficiencies in the State responsible, where there is a real risk that the transfer will lead to a
breach of the prohibition of inhumane treatment.
26. Art. 4 CFREU. See Joined Cases C-404 & 659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru; Case
C-220/18 PPU, ML, EU:C:2018:589; Case C-128/18, Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu,
EU:C:2019:857.
27. Art. 47 CFREU. See Case C-216/18 PPU, LM; Joined Cases C-354 & 412/20 PPU, L.
and P., EU:C:2020:1033.
28. The questions referred to the ECJ concerned detention conditions in Hungary and
Romania. Poor standards in facilities of deprivation of liberty are widespread across Europe and
certainly not limited to those two countries, as found by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) in judgments concerning several Member States: ECtHR, J.M.B. and others v.France,
Appl. No. 9671/15, judgment of 30 Jan. 2020; ECtHR,Clasens v.Belgium,Appl. No. 26564/16,
judgment of 20 May 2019; ECtHR, Petrescu v. Portugal, Appl. No. 23190/17, judgment of 3
Dec. 2019; ECtHR,Cirino and Renne v. Italy, Appl. Nos. 2539/13 and 4705/13, judgment of 20
Oct. 2017; ECtHR,Muršić v. Croatia, Appl. No. 7334/13, judgment of 20 Oct. 2016; ECtHR,
Nikitin and others v. Estonia, Appl. Nos. 23226/16 et al., judgment of 29 Jan. 2019.
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mechanism of inter-State surrender of (alleged or “certified”) offenders,
certain specific safeguards play a particularly prominent role (such as, most
obviously, those related to the treatment of detainees). The purely judicial
nature of the cooperation places judicial independence right at the centre of
the stage as an essential precondition for the healthy functioning of the EAW.
Independence is a cornerstone of the system of EU judicial protection and of
the rule of law, and lies at the very heart of Article 2 TEU.29 A Member State’s
commitment to judicial independence is directly related to that State’s respect
of the EU values. This impacts on the credibility of presuming that State to be
compliant with fundamental rights, which in turn is essential to the operation
of the EAW. The systemic relevance of judicial independence to the EAW is
twofold. First, all EAW procedures – from issuance through to execution –
must be carried out under independent judicial oversight.30 Second,
independence must be guaranteed in the issuing State post-surrender.
According to the exceptional circumstances doctrine, a real risk that the
person will be denied a right to an independent tribunal is a reason not to
execute the EAW.
Independence leads us to a third – closely related but broader – point
concerning the role of national courts and the cooperative nature of the EAW.
The triangular dynamic between the ECJ and the national authorities in the
EAW framework has many expressions, notably when it comes to the
possibility to refuse execution.31 The most visible example is the exchange of
information between the executing and the issuing authorities, with a view to
assessing the existence of a real risk to the person’s fundamental rights. The
systemic and “local” situation in the issuing State, as well as the proper
transmission of information to the executing authorities, are both relevant.The
executing authority has a pivotal role too, that of being proactive in terms of
evidence and information-gathering, raising questions to the ECJ,
implementing the preliminary rulings and the exceptional circumstances
doctrine.
In that context, things can go wrong in different ways through the fault of
either or both national authorities.The practice of national courts and the cases
that reached the ECJ show that possible scenarios in this regard include:
29. Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court),
EU:C:2019:531, para 58.
30. Case C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F v. Premier ministre, EU:C:2013:358, para 46.
31. This cooperation is not in contradiction with the automaticity of the system, since it
exists either in a physical form, e.g. clarifying details of the EAW, or as exception to the rule
embodied by the exceptional circumstances doctrine.
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breach of the duties of cooperation between national authorities;32 failure to
refer a question to the ECJ;33 incorrect application of or express disregard for
EU law, including preliminary rulings.34 The ECJ must provide a useful
response concerning the interpretation of EU law within the limits of its
jurisdiction as established by the Treaties. National authorities – courts and
tribunals specifically – have a legal obligation to be collaborative with each
other and with the Court. That cooperation provides the foundation for the
application of the exceptional circumstances doctrine, which is an essential
component of the sound functioning of mutual trust.
Against that background, mutual trust alone emerges as a fragile basis for
the EAW, if not supported by sincere cooperation as per the threefold
obligation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU: mutual assistance (between the EU
and the States) in carrying out their respective tasks; (for the States
specifically) taking the appropriate measures to fulfil their obligation under
EU law; facilitating the attainment of the Union’s objectives and refraining
from measures which could jeopardize that. We also see very clearly that
judicial independence is an essential precondition for the joint workability of
sincere cooperation and mutual trust. To stick to the example of the
exceptional circumstances doctrine: what is the credibility of a system whose
essential functioning is based on courts providing reliable information about
their independence, if they belong to a Member State where the systemic
independence of the judiciary itself has been blatantly compromised?35
Rhetorical as it may sound, it is argued that the question has no clear-cut
answer.
32. As detailed below, the ECJ found in Case C-220/18 PPU, ML, that the 78 questions
posed by the executing court to the issuing authority, because of their number and content in
relation to the facts of the case, were not compatible with the duty of sincere cooperation under
Art. 4(3) TEU.
33. See the national follow-up to LM in TheMinister for Justice and Equality v.Celmer (No
5) [2018] IEHC 639, 19 Nov. 2018, and the appeal proceedings in The Minister for Justice and
Equality v. Artur Celmer [2019] IESC 80, 12 Nov. 2019. It is argued below that the Irish courts,
when implementing the preliminary ruling, could – at the very least and considering the
importance of the case – have referred a further question to the ECJ to clarify the scope of
application of the two-step test.
34. The Portuguese Supreme Court ignored the ECJ’s ruling in Case C-327/18 PPU, RO,
according to which Member States should execute EAWs issued by the UK until the latter has
left the EU unless there is concrete evidence showing there are reasons to challenge the
presumption of mutual trust. See judgment 120/17.2YREVR.S1, 14 Feb. 2019, and the report of
the case in FIDE XXIX Congress Publication, Vol 1, 2020, pp. 44 et seq.
35. For policy proposals to address this and related issues, see Bárd and van Ballegooij,
“The effect of CJEU case law concerning the rule of law and mutual trust on national systems”
in Mitsilegas, Mancano and di Martino, The Court of Justice and European Criminal Law.
Leading Cases in a Contextual Analysis (Hart, 2019), pp. 455–467.
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The present article investigates these interconnected strands in a systemic
fashion. It argues that the EAW cannot work properly if mutual trust is not
supported by sincere cooperation, with judicial independence being a
necessary condition for that to happen. The argument develops along the
following lines. Section 2 introduces the key features of the EAW FD. Section
3 focuses on the grounds for refusal expressly laid down in the text of the FD.
Section 4 unpacks the exceptional circumstances doctrine, while Section 5
addresses reasons of invalidity of the EAW. In the framework of the complex
relationship between fundamental values and objectives of the Union, the
conclusions in Section 6 reveal the existence of a fil rouge drawing together
the importance of sincere cooperation for strengthening mutual trust, the role
of national courts in upholding the rule of law, and the significance of judicial
independence to the proper functioning of the EAW.
2. The EuropeanArrestWarrant Framework Decision
The EAW is defined in Article 1(1) of the FD as a judicial decision issued by
a Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member
State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal
prosecution, or executing a custodial sentence or detention order. While
Member States shall execute an EAW on the basis of the principle of mutual
recognition, the FD shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to
respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in
Article 6 TEU.36
The machinery of the EAW is organized around a delicate balance of power
between the issuing and executing States. The issuing and executing judicial
authorities must be the authorities competent to issue and execute an EAW by
virtue of the law of those States.37 An EAW is issued in relation to criminal
offences as they are defined and punished by the law of the issuing State.38 It
is the law of the executing State, however, that often determines the conditions
on which an EAW can be refused.39 Furthermore, it is shown below that the
practice has increasingly turned the authorities of the executing State into
bastions of fundamental rights. The EAW can be validly issued where a series
of conditions are met40 and as long as certain information has been included in
36. EAW FD, Art. 1(2) and (3).
37. Ibid., Art. 6.
38. Ibid., Art. 2(1) and (2).
39. See e.g. ibid., Arts. 4(4) and (7)(a).
40. This is to do, inter alia, with the minimum level of punishment that could be imposed
for the offence underlying the EAW according to the law of the issuing State as per Art. 2(1)
EAW FD.
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the warrant.41 The issuing and executing authorities must exchange
information promptly and as a matter of urgency if the information provided
by the issuing State does not enable the executing authority to make a decision
about surrender.42
The identification and interpretation of the reasons for refusal has been the
main battleground for the persons subject to EAWs, national authorities and
the ECJ. If the formative years of the EAW have been characterized by a strong
emphasis on automaticity and effectiveness of cooperation, as time went by
the approach of the Court and the EU legislature has become more nuanced.
We have seen the emergence of an articulated system of three main grounds
for refusal. First, there are the mandatory and optional grounds enumerated in
Articles 3 and 4 EAW FD. Second, there is the obligation not to execute the
warrant when there is a risk of fundamental rights violation in the issuing
State.Third, the EAW must not be executed if it is invalid. Certain key features
of this law are worth highlighting. Much of the framework presented below is
based on the exegetic endeavour of the ECJ, as is mostly evidenced by the
principle of mutual trust.The evolution of that principle has gone hand in hand
with another fundamental element of this rich case law, which is the
importance of dialogue between the national actors in the cooperation
throughout recognition and execution. Particularly prompted by the rule of
law backsliding pursued by the Polish Government, the development of the
concept of, and role for, judicial independence has proved vital to the dynamic
relationship between mutual trust and cooperation. In the next three sections,
all those factors play out, often against the background of the relationship
between fundamental values and objectives of the EU – more specifically, the
respect for fundamental rights and the aim to avoid impunity.
3. Mandatory and optional grounds for refusal
The FD provides a list of cases when the executing judicial authority shall
(mandatory grounds) ormay (optional grounds) refuse execution of the EAW.
Apart from the exceptions working as coordination mechanisms, based on
territorial jurisdiction,43 the grounds for refusal and conditionality are clearly
rooted in specific fundamental rights, such as the right to a fair trial,44 the
41. Ibid., Art. 8.
42. Ibid., Art. 15.
43. Ibid., Art. 4(7). These include cases where the verification of double criminality is still
allowed as per Art. 4(1) EAW FD.
44. Ibid., Arts. 4(a) and 5(1).
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rights of the child,45 the principle of ne bis in idem,46 the rehabilitative
function47 and the proportionality48 of criminal penalties. These are framed as
either mandatory or optional grounds for refusal, or conditions of execution
depending on the degree to which they outweigh the importance of surrender.
However, they are very much concerned with “accidental” fundamental rights
violation – possible bumps along the road caused by different States’ laws,
operational and specific aspects, or the nature of cooperation itself.49 They do
not originate from the fear that the issuing State might be caught in systemic
violations, or might be affected by structural problems capable of
undermining the EAW mechanism. In this sense, these exceptions are in line
with and reinforce the presumptive nature of mutual trust. That presumptive
component is married to the importance that the national authorities maintain
a collaborative disposition. This is particularly visible when it comes to
optional grounds for refusal, as the discretion enjoyed by a State’s court must
be used consistently with their duties of cooperation. With a view to
increasing the chances of reintegration, Article 4(6) EAW FD allows the
executing court to refuse surrender where the person is a “national” or
“resident” of, or is “staying in”, the executing State provided that the latter
State undertakes to execute the sentence. However, EU law precludes national
legislation that does not authorize surrender of a foreign national who
possesses a permanent residence permit, while the executing court is merely
required to inform the issuing State of their willingness to take over the
enforcement but at that moment has not actually done so, and, moreover, the
refusal to surrender is not challengeable in the event that execution of the
sentence subsequently proves to be impossible.50
The ECJ has used the mandatory and optional grounds for refusal to
develop the concept of mutual trust and the functioning of the EAW. As a basic
“rule of thumb”, the Court has consistently stressed the importance of mutual
45. Ibid., Art. 3(3).
46. Ibid., Arts. 3(1) and (2), 4(2), (3), (4) and (5). See Case C-261/09, Gaetano Mantello,
EU:C:2010:683; Case C-268/17, AY, EU:C:2018:602.
47. Arts. 4(6) and 5(3) EAW FD. The principle of rehabilitation of penalties is widely
considered a principle shared by the Member States. See the European Parliament Resolution
on respect for human rights in the European Union (1997), O.J. 1999, C 98/279, where it is
stated that custodial sentences must have a corrective and rehabilitative function (para 78). At
Member State level, see e.g. Art. 2 of the German Law on the execution of sentences of
imprisonment (Strafvollzugsgesetz). With regard to the Spanish and Italian constitutions, see
Art. 25(2) and Art. 27(3) respectively.
48. Art. 5(2) EAW FD.
49. These can be the age requirement for being held criminally liable, the different options
given to the executing authority to avoid double jeopardy, the extreme case of life
imprisonment, or the possibility to refuse execution because the person would have better
chances of reintegration in the executing State.
50. Case C-579/15, Daniel Adam Popławski, EU:C:2017:503, para 24.
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trust as to the fact that each Member State accepts the application of the
criminal law in force in the other Member States, even though the
implementation of its own national law might produce a different outcome.51
The underlying assumption is that States are all capable of providing
equivalent and effective protection of the fundamental rights recognized at EU
level.52 The exceptions to, and conditions of, execution, express that view of
mutual trust in two, complementary, fashions. On the one hand, the executing
court may refuse execution where they have already decided not to prosecute
the offence on which the EAW is based,53 with the issuing State having to
accept that the case has already been addressed and “closed” by another State
authority. On the other hand, the FD provides that an EAW must be refused if
the person concerned may not, owing to his age, be held criminally responsible
under the law of the executing State for the acts on which the EAW is based.
The principle of mutual trust implies that the executing court “must simply
verify whether the person concerned has reached the minimum age required to
be regarded as criminally responsible in the executing State”, without carrying
out an individual assessment of circumstances, as they would do according to
their national law.54
The exceptions embody mutual trust, but their implementation and proper
functioning is built on sincere cooperation. Depending on the circumstances,
cooperation can require that the executing State either self-restrains, or
actively engages with the issuing State. Furthermore, the cooperation on
which those exceptions are based is largely and ultimately driven by the
achievement of the objectives of the FD (alone, or in combination with other
goals such as social reintegration). Thus, the creation of pockets of impunity
across the Union is prevented, primarily through ensuring a swift surrender
procedure.55 This is consistent with the nature of the exceptions, since they are
mostly premised on the fact that either justice is being done, has already been
done, or will be done, or that a public interest (e.g. minor age of the person)
outweighs prosecution.
Building on that approach, the conversation about refusing execution and
mutual trust has become particularly difficult when Member States have tried
to use those exceptions as a bridge towards uncharted territory: that is,
introducing a broader and unwritten ground for refusal based on possible
51. See Case C-367/16,Dawid Piotrowski, EU:C:2018:27, para 52. Such understanding of
mutual trust evokes the early days of the principle in the context of the AFSJ, where trust was
used to develop transnational ne bis in idem under Art. 54 CISA. See Joined Cases C-187 &
385/01, Hüseyin Gözütok and Klaus Brügge, EU:C:2003:87, para 33.
52. Case C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F., paras. 49 and 50.
53. EAW FD, Art. 4(3).
54. Case C-367/16, Piotrowski, para 62.
55. EAW FD, Recital 5.
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fundamental rights violations. For instance, Article 4a(1) allows refusal when
the judgment on which the EAW is based was issued in absentia. However, the
FD also lists very specific cases where the EAW must be executed
nonetheless, because it can be presumed that fundamental rights were
respected even though the person did not attend the trial.
In Melloni, the ECJ famously found that the executing court cannot make
the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional on the conviction
being open to review in the issuing State, in order to avoid an adverse effect on
the right to a fair trial and the rights of the defence guaranteed constitutionally
by the executing State. Allowing an exception to execution not provided in the
FD would cast doubt “on the uniformity of the standard of protection of
fundamental rights as defined in [the FD], would undermine the principles of
mutual trust . . . and would, therefore, compromise the efficacy of [the
FD]”.56 Mutual trust is here understood as a mono-dimensional vector of
transnational law enforcement efficiency; over time, however, the approach of
the Court has become more nuanced and sophisticated.
Years later, asked about whether the in absentia exception would also cover
appeal proceedings or the execution or application of a custodial sentence, the
Court forcefully stated a series of principles governing the operation of the
EAW and mutual trust. Firstly, the principles of mutual trust – and recognition,
on which the FD is based – must not in any way undermine fundamental
rights.57 Secondly, Member States and their judicial authorities are not
exempt from the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental
legal principles (emphasis added). Thirdly, compliance with that obligation
reinforces the high level of trust that national legal systems are all capable of
providing equivalent and effective protection of the fundamental rights
recognized at EU level. Fourthly, the issuing and executing authorities must
make full use of the FD to cooperate effectively and, on that basis, to foster
mutual trust. This includes the exchange of information under Article 15
FD.58
The facts of the cases in Melloni and the second group of judgments are
different. The former concerned, inter alia, the possibility for the executing
court to apply its State’s higher fundamental right standards and refuse
execution. The latter revolved around the interpretation of the concept of the
“trial resulting in the decision”, at which the person was not present. That
variance notwithstanding, the evolution in the approach to mutual trust and the
dynamic underlying the EAW is apparent. The presumptive element of trust is
more carefully balanced against the credibility of that presumption, which
56. Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107, para 63.
57. Case C-270/17 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie v. Tadas Tupikas, EU:C:2017:628, para 59.
58. Case C-571/17 PPU, Samet Ardic, EU:C:2017:1026, paras. 89–91.
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comes with actual and verifiable compliance. The judicial authorities play a
major role in preserving the credibility; their respect for fundamental rights is
a precondition for the stability of the whole edifice, and for the cooperation
that must support mutual trust.
Granted, a fundamental rights-oriented interpretation of the FD should not
undermine the effectiveness of judicial cooperation.59 However, there is a
tipping point where that reconciliation might no longer be pursued. In fact,
though stated in the context of Article 4a(1), the principles set out by the Court
speak louder than the limited and specific disruptions envisaged by that
exception. Those principles have a systemic “flavour”, and seem concerned
with the scenario where a Member State’s constitutional system is affected by
structural defects. What to do when that happens? Some answers are in the
next section, which focuses on the exceptional circumstances doctrine.
4. The exceptional circumstances doctrine
After some reluctance,60 the ECJ has established the conditions on which the
presumption of mutual trust must be rebutted, and the EAW not executed, on
grounds of possible fundamental rights violations. In this context, the Court
relied on Article 1(3) FD to develop the exceptional circumstances doctrine
with regard to two fundamental rights (so far), i.e. the absolute prohibition of
degrading treatment and the right to an independent tribunal. The general test
consists of a two-step assessment to be carried out by the executing authority.
Firstly, it must be verified that systemic deficiencies exist, which affect the
right in question in the issuing State.61 Secondly, it must be ascertained
specifically and precisely whether those deficiencies will pose a real risk to
the right of the person concerned in the specific case. The executing court
must, pursuant to Article 15(2) EAW FD, request that the issuing authority
provide any supplementary information that it considers necessary for
assessing whether there is such a risk.62 The decision on the surrender must be
postponed until the supplementary information is obtained. Meanwhile, the
detention of the person can be extended provided that that measure is
proportionate, with regard being had to the presumption of innocence and
their right to liberty.63 If, after an examination of the available information –
59. Case C-270/17 PPU, Tupikas, para 63.
60. Case C-396/11, Ciprian Vasile Radu, EU:C:2013:39.
61. The assessment should be based on objective, reliable, specific, and properly updated
material. Joined Cases C-404 & 659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, para 89.
62. Ibid., para 97; Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, paras. 76.
63. Joined Cases C-404 & 659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, paras. 98–101.
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including that provided by the issuing State – the real risk cannot be
discounted, the executing authority must refrain from executing the EAW.64
The exceptional circumstances doctrine is built on a series of
interdependent components: modus operandi of the test; standard of proof;
content of the right under attack; evidence-gathering process via Article 15
FD; and implementation of the test at national level. These constituent
elements reflect the legal set-up that supports the operation of the EAW, a
mechanism where judicial independence is a fundamental precondition for
the joint operation of sincere cooperation and mutual trust.
4.1. The concept of judicial independence
The definition of judicial independence is particularly important to assess the
functioning of the doctrine. Article 2 TEU and the rule of law are the
cornerstones of the ECJ’s approach to judicial independence and are identified
as the sources of salient provisions.65 Firstly, there is the right to a fair trial and
to an effective remedy as per Article 47 CFREU. Secondly, Article 19 TEU
requires that national courts and the ECJ ensure the full application of EU law
in all Member States and judicial protection of the rights of individuals under
that law.66 The right to an independent tribunal is key to the protection offered
jointly by Article 47 CFREU and Article 19 TEU; it forms part of the essence
of the right to a fair trial, and is vital to the effective judicial review of any
decision or measure relating to the application of EU law.67
The Court sees independence as consisting of an internal and external
dimension. External independence presupposes autonomy of judicial
functions
“without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to
any other body and without taking orders or instructions from any source
whatsoever, thus being protected against external interventions or
pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to
influence their decisions”.68
64. Ibid., para 101.
65. Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, para 35.
66. Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, EU:C:2018:117, paras.
31–41. Some scholars see Art. 19 TEU as both a specific expression of the rule of law and a lex
specialis to the principle of sincere cooperation under Art. 4(3) TEU. Groussot and Martinico,
“Mutual trust, the rule of law and the Charter: A new age of judicial activism”, EU Law Live, 25
Jan. 2020, available at <eulawlive.com/long-read-mutual-trust-the-rule-of-law-and-the-char
ter-a-new-age-for-judicial-activism-by-xavier-grousot-and-giuseppe-martinico/> (all websites
last visited 25 Feb. 2021).
67. Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, paras. 49–51.
68. Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), para 72.
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This requires certain guarantees concerning, especially, protection against
removal from office, remuneration commensurate with the importance of the
functions, and a disciplinary regime not prone to being used as a system of
political control.69 Internal independence is linked to impartiality and seeks to
ensure equal distance from the parties to the proceedings, which comes with
objectivity and the absence of any interest in the outcome apart from the strict
application of the rule of law.70 These rules are meant to preclude any
influence – direct or indirect – which is liable to have an effect on the decision
of the judges concerned.71 Appearances matter too: “What is at stake is the
confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the
public”.72 In other words, “justice must not only be done, it must also be seen
to be done”.73 On that basis, the judicial dialogue via (mostly) Article 267
TFEU between Polish judges and the ECJ has led the latter to upholding
judicial independence against the authoritarian reforms introduced by the
current Polish Government. Over the last couple of years, the Court has
declared the unlawfulness of the exclusive jurisdiction on matters of EU law
conferred upon the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court;74 the
different retirement age for men and women for judges and public
prosecutors, and the power granted to the Minister for Justice to decide
whether to authorize judges of the ordinary courts to continue to carry out
their duties beyond the new retirement age of those judges;75 the retroactive
application of the lowering of the retirement age of the judges of the Supreme
Court, and the discretion given to the President of the Republic to extend the
period of judicial activity of judges of that court beyond the newly fixed
retirement age.76
While the ECJ’s approach is largely reliant on the understanding of judicial
independence developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
there is some difference between the two that is worth highlighting. In general,
it is important to remember that the guarantees of independence are required
of a “tribunal” in the context of the right to a fair trial, but also of a “judge or
other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power” in relation to
69. Case C-64/16, Juízes Portugueses, para 45; Case C-506/04, Graham J.Wilson v. Ordre
des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, EU:C:2006:587, para 51.
70. Case C-506/04,Wilson, para 52.
71. Joined Cases C-585, 624 & 625/18, A.K. v. Krajowa Rada Sadownictwa, CP, DO v.
Sad Najwyż szy, EU:C:2019:982, para 125.
72. Ibid., para 128. Here, the ECJ quotes verbatim the ECtHR. Among many, see ECtHR,
Morice v. France [GC], Appl. No. 29369/10, judgment of 24 April 2015, para 78.
73. ECtHR, De Cubber v. Belgium, Appl. No. 9186/80, judgment of 26 Oct.1984, para 26;
ECtHR, Micallef v. Malta [GC], Appl. No. 17056/06, judgment of 15 Oct. 2009, para 98.
74. Joined Cases C-585, 624 & 625/18, A. K., CP and DO.
75. Case C-192/18, Commission v. Poland, EU:C:2019:924.
76. Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court).
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habeas corpus.77 The ECJ follows the ECtHR, as it regards impartiality as
subjective and objective.78 The ECtHR, however, sees internal independence
as freedom from within the judiciary,79 whereas external independence as
concerning external pressure – from e.g. the executive.80 Is this divergence
purely terminological, or can there be practical consequences attached to it?
The Court seems to treat independence and impartiality as cumulative parts of
one single test. Both the ECJ and the ECtHR hold that independence and
objective impartiality “are closely linked”. The former, however, finds that
this generally means they require joint examination,81 whereas the latter states
that they may require joint examination, depending on the circumstances
(emphasis added).82 If those subtests are indeed cumulative, who would
benefit in the context of the exceptional circumstances doctrine? The answer
depends on the party bearing the burden of proof. If the burden is on the court
or tribunal in the spotlight, that would make it harder for them to satisfy the
relevant legal requirements – a test which is easier for the court to fail gives an
advantage to the defendant. The opposite would be true if the burden were on
the person subject to the EAW, and both parts of the test had to be met to
convince the executing court not to execute the warrant.
A look at the other components of the exceptional circumstances doctrine
helps find a response to this legal question with significant systemic
implications.
4.2. The standard of proof
The standard of proof established by the exceptional circumstances doctrine is
the real risk. This is a flexible concept, and we cannot pinpoint it on a
spectrum of probability as we would do a location on a map. Through such a
test, however, the executing court is required to carry out a probability
77. Art. 5(3) ECHR. ECtHR,McKay v.United Kingdom [GC], Appl. No. 543/03, judgment
of 3 Oct. 2006, para 35.
78. Subjective impartiality is related to the personal conviction or interest of a judge in a
case, whereas objective impartiality aims to determine whether the judge offered sufficient
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect and whether there are ascertainable
facts which may raise doubts as to their impartiality. See Appl. No. 9186/80, Cubber, cited
supra note 73, para 25; ECtHR, Grieves v. the United Kingdom [GC], Appl. No. 57067/00,
judgment of 16 Dec. 2003, para 69; Appl. No. 29369/10,Morice, cited supra note 72, para 76.
79. ECtHR, Parlov-Tkalčić v. Croatia, Appl. No. 24810/06, judgment of 22 Dec. 2009,
para 86.
80. ECtHR,Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v. Poland, Appl. No. 23614/08, judgment of
30 Nov. 2010, para 45.
81. Joined Cases C-585, 624 & 625/18, A. K., CP and DO, para 129.
82. ECtHR, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], App. Nos. 55391/13,
57728/13 and 74041/13, judgment of 6 Nov. 2018, para 150.
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assessment: they must ascertain the existence of a situation of danger that is
not purely hypothetical and is based on materials portraying the violation as a
concrete possibility. With that in mind, it is submitted that a particularly strict
interpretation of the standard of “real risk” – an interpretation that might take
it closer to “near certainty” – would not do justice to the nature of the test itself,
and should therefore be avoided. This consideration will prove particularly
important in the context of implementation at national level.
The real risk being the general standard of proof, the test unfolds with a
slightly different wording depending on the right at stake – at least, as the law
stands at present. In the case of inhumane treatment, the deficiencies may be
“systemic or generalized, or . . . may affect certain groups of people,
or . . . certain place of detention” (emphasis added).83 When the real risk
exists that surrender to the issuing State will result in the breach of an absolute
prohibition, the absence of systemic deficiencies does not prevent the
executing court from refusing to proceed.84 Furthermore, if the risk cannot be
discounted within a reasonable time, the executing State must decide whether
the surrender procedure should be brought to an end.85 When making that
decision, the absolute nature of the prohibition means that the existence of a
real risk cannot be weighed against considerations related to the efficacy of
judicial cooperation.86
As stated in LM first, when it comes to the right to an independent tribunal,
the assessment must first revolve around the operation of the system of justice
in the issuing State.87 Second, there must be precise and specific elements
showing that systemic deficiencies are liable to have an impact at the level of
the State’s courts with jurisdiction over the proceedings and there must be
substantial grounds for believing that the person will run a real risk, having
regard to their personal situation, as well as to the nature of the offence for
which they are being prosecuted and the factual context that form the basis of
the EAW.
These steps reflect the independence plus impartiality approach of the ECJ,
in that they effectively require the defendant to prove both aspects to halt
surrender. In the more recent L. and P. judgment, following questions raised by
the District Court of Amsterdam, it was found that systemic deficiencies
concerning the independence of a State’s judiciary, even if worsened over
83. Joined Cases C-404 & 659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, para 104.
84. See, in this sense, Lenaerts, op. cit. supra note 15, 833. Or, as other authors put it, a
single breach might in itself express systemic deficiencies because of its seriousness. See von
Bogdandy, “Principles of a systemic deficiencies doctrine: How to protect checks and balances
in the Member States”, 57 CML Rev. (2020), 705–740, 718.
85. Joined Cases C-404 & 659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, para 104.
86. Case C-128/18, Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu, paras. 82–84.
87. Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, para 61.
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time, do not automatically affect every decision issued by every court of that
State.88 The two-step test still stands; the examination involves an analysis of
the information obtained on the basis of different criteria, and the steps cannot
overlap one another.89
On the one hand, there is the ECJ’s refusal to allow general deficiencies to
suffice for not executing an EAW. This seems to be mostly shaped by three
systemic concerns. First, an interpretation to the contrary would amount to a
de facto suspension of the EAW, while the preamble of the EAW FD empowers
only the European Council to do so.90 Second, accepting that judges or courts
of a Member State can no longer be considered independent en masse would
deprive those courts and judges of the possibility to make use of the
preliminary ruling mechanism, while precisely that mechanism has played a
key role in relation to resisting the “reforms” of the Polish government. Third,
it would entail a high risk of impunity of requested persons present in a
territory other than that in which they allegedly committed an offence, thereby
undermining a fundamental objective of the EAW and the EU more broadly.91
On the other hand, and while aware of its institutional constraints, the Court
emphasized that the finding that there has been an increase in systemic
deficiencies must prompt the executing authority to exercise vigilance.92
Furthermore, the ECJ found that statements by public authorities of the
issuing State, which are liable to interfere with how an individual case is
handled, must be taken into account when applying the two-step test.93
It is submitted that the threshold set by the test might not be insurmountable
as may appear. Firstly, the precision and specificity of the materials must show
that the systemic deficiencies are liable to affect the competent court of the
issuing State. Different linguistic versions of the case law confirm that the
exacting precision of the elements is softened by a milder predictive
assessment; expressions are used that are semantically close to liable to
(puedan, susceptibles, geeignet, idonee) and depict deficiencies as capable of
affecting the independence of the court with jurisdiction. Secondly, the risk
does not need to emerge cumulatively from the personal situation, the nature
of the offence, and the factual context. These are, rather, some of the fields of
investigation for the executing court. The second step leaves the executing
authorities a certain degree of flexibility, which they can use in case of serious
88. Joined Cases C-354 & 412/20 PPU, L. and P., para 40.
89. Ibid., para 56.
90. Recital 10 EAW FD refers to the Council, not the European Council, but the relevant
provisions of the Treaty at the time clarify that it was the Council in its composition of Heads
of State and Government.
91. Ibid., paras. 62–64.
92. Ibid., para 60.
93. Ibid., para 69.
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and reliable concerns with regard to the fairness of the trial of the person
subject to the EAW.
4.3. Evidence gathering and sincere cooperation
In that context, a key component of the exceptional circumstances doctrine is
the evidence-gathering process via Article 15 EAW FD. Article 15 EAW FD
must be used as a last resort94 and consistently with the duty of sincere
cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU.95 That duty would be breached, for
example, if the executing court were to ask questions that, due to their number
and nature, jeopardized the timely completion of the EAW procedures within
the deadlines laid down in the FD. This would result in a risk of impunity,
which would in turn be incompatible with the objectives of the FD and Article
3(2)TEU.96 If the issuing State provides reassurance that the person will not be
exposed to a real risk of fundamental rights violations, the executing court
must consider the legal weight to be attached to that reassurance. If it comes
from a (non-judicial) authority of the issuing State (such as the Ministry of
Justice), the executing authority may rely on that in the context of the overall
assessment.97 If reassurance is given by the issuing judicial authority, the
executing judicial authority must rely on that assurance, save in exceptional
circumstances where there are specific indications to the contrary.98
In the EAW mechanism, mutual trust underpins the functioning of the
system and amounts to the rebuttable presumption of fundamental rights
compliance. The exceptional circumstances doctrine is an integral part of that
presumption: to define its operation and scope of application is to define – to
an extent at least – the identity of the EAW. In turn, the doctrine and the EAW
more broadly cannot operate properly without sincere cooperation.
In the Court’s endeavour to preserve the constitutional fabric of the Union,
sincere cooperation plays – more or less explicitly – a fundamental role.
Sincere cooperation gears the actions of the Union and the States towards the
fulfilment of their tasks, compliance with their obligations, and achievement
of the objectives under EU law. Furthermore, that duty applies specifically to
the Union institutions in relation to one another.99
The ECJ has been creative in interpreting its own jurisdiction over the
national reforms of the judiciary in Poland. Its use of Article 19 TEU speaks
very clearly to the Court’s unwillingness to sit quietly and watch the rule of
94. Case C-220/18 PPU,ML, para 79.
95. Ibid., para 104.
96. Ibid., paras. 84–86.
97. Ibid., para 117.
98. Case C-128/18, Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu, paras. 68–69.
99. Art. 13(2) TEU.
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law being dismantled in an EU Member State. There are, nonetheless, legal
limits to what the Court can do that may not be ignored. The exclusive
prerogative of suspending the EAW towards a Member State is conferred by
the FD on the European Council; granted, the conferral is contained in a
non-legally binding recital. Should the Court introduce a de facto suspension,
however, and allow the executing courts not to surrender on the basis of the
systemic deficiencies only, that would raise clear issues of the ECJ’s own
compliance with its Treaty obligations and legitimacy vis-à-vis the Union
institutions as well as the national courts, who have relied on Article 267
TFEU as a lifeline against the brazen attacks on their independence. It might
be objected that the European Council has failed to act100 on the suspension of
the EAW in relation to Poland. The question arises as to whether the latter
circumstance enables the ECJ to take that controversial step instead.
The understanding of the ECJ’s own role bears further consequences related
to sincere cooperation. This flows from the need to give an interpretation of
EU law that can make systemic sense across the different threads of case law,
and takes into account the different interests at stake.The threefold obligations
inherent in the duty of sincere cooperation entail a balancing exercise, as
exemplified by the objective of combating impunity. Avoiding impunity must
not be used as a counter-balancing factor against the risk of inhumane
treatment, when deciding about surrender. Nonetheless, that objective does
orient – if not limit – the executing authority’s action when implementing the
two-step test and requesting additional information from the issuing State. As
the most forceful expression of the principle of mutual trust, the EAW is the
means to combat making use of the absence of internal frontiers for illicit
purposes, and therefore to keep the borderless area sustainable. This is a
fundamental objective of the Union as per Article 3(2) TEU, and a defining
trait of its DNA as a polity.The finding that systemic deficiencies do not affect
every decision from every court of the land implies, inter alia, that not every
EAW is issued because of political pressure from the executive. The Court
acknowledges that fighting impunity can and must give way, in some cases; it
is also cognizant, though, that that objective may not be taken out of the
equation altogether, but must live – as far as possible – with coping
mechanisms such as the exceptional circumstances doctrine. In such a
systemic assessment, the risk of impunity is invoked by the Court but what
that danger actually entails or presupposes is far from clear. How do we define
impunity, when the independence of the court meting out punishment might
be seriously under siege? Though it might be objected that a specific question
around impunity or the interpretation of Article 3(2) TEU more broadly has
100. “Failure to act” is used here in a broader sense, without necessarily implying that the
European Council’s inertia has already met the requirements set by Art. 265 TFEU.
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not been submitted to the Court yet, it is argued that a risk of impunity would
be avoided if, at the very least, one of the optional grounds for refusal under
Article 4 EAW FD was applicable to the facts of the case brought before the
ECJ.
Against that background, Article 15 FD and the Court’s interpretation
thereof enshrines the nexus between judicial independence, sincere
cooperation and mutual trust underpinning the functioning of the EAW. On
that basis, Article 15 FD is an important lever at the disposal of the executing
authorities in the exercise of their duty of vigilance.101 The fundamental
question arises as to when cooperation from the issuing authority may no
longer be considered sincere. Judicial independence constitutes a
fundamental precondition to this framework. Without a reliable judicial
interlocutor in the issuing State, the principle of mutual trust cannot work
healthily and neither can the EAW. The fact that a State government has
defiantly proceeded with their authoritarian plans, despite the ECJ’s
judgments pointing to their unlawfulness, undoubtedly undermines the
credibility of its reassurance in the context of the Article 15 FD exchange.
Would the same apply to reassurance given from a judicial authority of that
State?The executing court must take into account the reassurance given unless
there are specific indications to the contrary. Similarly to what was stated
above (section 4.2), materials and indications (including those provided by the
defendant) can be specific without necessarily having to prove
untrustworthiness and risk of violation with absolute certainty. Reassurance
given by the issuing judicial authority in a State where independence is under
attack is, therefore, not the end of the story.
It is for the executing authorities to use the room for manoeuvre left by the
exceptional circumstances doctrine which, it is once again forcefully
submitted, requires a moderate level of risk. The next section addresses the
last, essential, component of the fundamental rights exception, and considers
the options at the disposal of the executing authority.
4.4. Implementation at the level of the Member States
It goes without saying that national courts are the backbone of a system of
inter-State judicial cooperation. On the one hand, the executing court leads the
evidence-gathering process, applies the test to the facts, and enjoys a certain
101. On the rights that at violation of the assurance might create for the person concerned,
and on the compatibility of this approach with the ECtHR case law, see Caeiro, “Scenes from a
marriage: Trust, distrust and (re)assurances in the execution of a European Arrest Warrant” in
Carrera, Curtin, and Geddes (Eds.), 20 Years Anniversary of the Tampere Programme:
Europeanisation Dynamics of the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (European
University Institute, 2020), p. 239.
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margin of appreciation in implementing the exceptional circumstance clause.
On the other hand, the issuing State must provide information under Article
15(2) EAW FD and bears the burden of proof once the two steps of the test are
met.
The Dublin High Court was the first one to apply the doctrine in relation to
judicial independence, being the referring court in LM. The Dublin High
Court considered that the situation at stake failed to meet the ECJ’s test, but it
did so – in the opinion of the present author – on very debatable legal grounds.
Firstly, the High Court ignored the ECJ’s creation of its own exceptional
circumstances doctrine. Building on the equivalence between Article 47
CFREU and Article 6(1) ECHR, the High Court relied on the “risk of flagrant
denial of justice” as the standard of proof. This constitutes the standard used
by the ECtHR for extra-territorial application of the ECHR in extradition
cases, which is different from the threshold set by the ECJ in LM in the EAW
framework, the latter being an intra-EU system of judicial cooperation.102 In
the wake of that, the High Court replaced the ECJ’s wording (substantial
grounds to believe the person will run a real risk of breach of his right to a fair
trial) with the “nullification or destruction of the very essence of the right” of
protection against the flagrant denial of justice. Such a fundamental
misunderstanding had a knock-on effect on the consideration of the factual
context. The High Court observed that the systemic deficiencies of the Polish
judiciary “will affect the court level before which this respondent will be tried
if he is surrendered”.103 In assessing the plentiful factual circumstances before
it, and comments from the Deputy Minister of Justice on the respondent that
undermined the presumption of innocence, the High Court however
concluded that those statements were not capable of causing a real risk of
flagrant denial of justice. This was so despite the acknowledged role of the
Polish Minister in prosecution, control of courts’ presidents and
vice-presidents, and the disciplinary process.104 On appeal, the Supreme
Court sidelined the issue of the standard of proof, and developed its reasoning
much more in line with the “spirit” of the ruling in the preliminary reference.
The Supreme Court concluded, however, that “while the individual features of
this case are undoubtedly troubling . . . they do not bring the case over the
threshold”. The conclusion was based, inter alia, on the statements provided
by the judge named as representative of the issuing judicial authority, who
102. Celmer (No 5) [2018] IEHC 639, para 32. This is not to say that the standard of “real
risk” was created by the ECJ in the context of the EAW. It was used by the Court in Joined Cases
C-411 & 493/10, N.S., para 94, and by the ECtHR in cases of deportation or extradition and
potential inhumane treatments. See, among many, ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy, Appl. No. 37201/06,
judgment of 28 Feb. 2008, para 125.
103. Celmer (No 5) [2018] IEHC 639, paras. 93–98.
104. Ibid., para 117.
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dismissed the statements of the Minister on the defendant “as little more than
the type of statement made by a politician”.105 The conclusions in both
judgments, however, opt for a stricter understanding of the “real risk”, which
triggers the question of whether the test has been placed in the correct area of
the spectrum of probability.
As the interference of the Polish Government with the independence of the
judiciary increased through legislative changes and disciplinary actions,
executing courts across the Union have become increasingly cautious about
surrender of persons to Poland. The District Court in Amsterdam106 – the only
one in the Netherlands considering EAW cases – suspended the surrender in
all EAWs from Poland107 and put the question to the ECJ as to whether the
deterioration of the independence of the judiciary would be enough to refuse
surrender – a question to which the ECJ, as mentioned above, answered in the
negative.108 The High Regional Court (HRC) of Karlsruhe refused execution
after applying the exceptional circumstances test and taking into account the
impact of the further government reforms.109 On the same grounds, the Italian
Supreme Court ordered a lower court to consider the possible impact of these
reforms on its previous decision to surrender.110
The situation post-LM offers a diverse picture of implementation of the test
at national level, which gives an idea of how far from straightforward the
application of the fundamental rights exception is. This is especially so when
it comes to judicial independence, where the test in itself and the fact-finding
process is likely to be particularly complex. While a blanket suspension of the
mechanism is difficult to square with the national courts’duties under EU law,
a two-step assessment supported by a request for information to the issuing
State’s authorities would be unproblematic. This is what the HRC of
Karlsruhe did.The District Court ofAmsterdam did the same, in the context of
the EAW that led to L. and P., where some of the questions from the executing
105. Artur Celmer, [2019] IESC 80, paras. 86–87.
106. For a broader analysis of the practice of this court with regard to the EAWs, see Martufi
and Gigengack, “Exploring mutual trust through the lens of an executing judicial authority: The
practice of the Court of Amsterdam in EAW proceedings”, 11 NJECL (2020), 282–298.
107. This sparked an equal and opposite reaction by the Polish National Public Prosecutor.
See Jałoszewski, “Poland’s National Public Prosecutor is going to war with the Netherlands”,
available at <ruleoflaw.pl/polands-national-public-prosecutor-is-going-to-war-with-the-nether
lands/>.
108. See Wójcik, “The Netherlands will extradite no-one to Poland under European Arrest
Warrant”, available at <ruleoflaw.pl/the-netherlands-will-extradite-no-one-to-poland-under-
european-arrest-warrant/>.
109. Wahl, “Fair trial concerns: German Court suspends execution of Polish EAW”,
available at <eucrim.eu/news/fair-trial-concerns-german-court-suspends-execution-polish-
eaw/>.
110. Decision available at <www.italgiure.giustizia.it/xway/application/nif/clean/hc.dll?
verbo=attach&db=snpen&id=./20200526/snpen@s60@a2020@n15924@tS.clean.pdf>.
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authority reached the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court in Poland
but received no response. While no definitive conclusions should be drawn
from silence, this is also a factor that cannot be overlooked in the present
context. In other words, it is argued that the exceptional circumstances
doctrine affords national courts room to comply with EU law and refrain from
surrender in cases that give rise to concerns in terms of a fair trial.
There are, however, questions outstanding concerning the fate of the
suspect or convicted person once execution has been refused. If the executing
court has no jurisdiction over the case, exploring the existence of other
Member States that might take over the case would offer limited relief and
significant practical problems.The State with jurisdiction would have to agree
to take charge, but the file of the case and the evidence-gathering process
might not be straightforward – especially considering that the authorities in a
position to facilitate the process would be those who have been considered
untrustworthy. If no State other than the issuing one has jurisdiction, the
option in sight seems to be to let the person walk free. The outcome would
bring us back to square one, with the considerations made above about
impunity and breach of the States’ Treaty obligations under – primarily –
Articles 3(2) and 4(3)TEU.As the law stands at present, it is inevitable that the
conundrum is resolved on a case-by-case basis, by balancing whether the
specific circumstances trump the need to preserve the effectiveness of
cooperation.
5. Invalidity
The ECJ has carried out a certain judicial harmonization on the basis of the
EAW FD, by defining key words to the EAW mechanism as autonomous
concepts of EU law.111 Such a thread of judgments forms part of a broader case
law, where the ECJ has interpreted possible causes of invalidity of an EAW.
Invalidity constitutes a more radical exception to execution than that based on
fundamental rights, since it results in the legal non-existence of the EAW and
gives no discretion as to its recognition and execution. This section focuses on
the concept of judicial authority in that respect. It discusses the Court’s
flexible understanding of the concept of judicial independence and its
systemic consequences.
111. Mancano, ”Judicial harmonisation through autonomous concepts of European Union
Law: The example of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision”, 43 EL Rev. (2018),
69–88; Mitsilegas, “Autonomous concepts, diversity management and mutual trust in Europe’s
area of criminal justice”, 57 CML Rev. (2020), 45–78.
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5.1. General principles of judicial authority and effective protection
The definition of judicial authority as an autonomous concept of EU law has
become a topic of an emerging body of law on causes of invalidity. The
starting point is the definition of an EAW which, according to a joint reading
of Articles 1(1) and 6(1) FD, is a judicial decision issued by a Member State
judicial authority. Firstly, the ECJ founds its reasoning on the premise that the
high level of confidence on which the EAW is built requires proper judicial
oversight, which in turn can be guaranteed in the presence of respect for
judicial independence and separation of powers.112 Therefore, EAWs issued
by the police service or ministry of justice cannot be considered valid.113 This
is consistent with the evidence-based approach to mutual trust discussed in the
previous sections, and confirms once more the understanding of judicial
independence as a fundamental precondition for the functioning of the EAW.
Secondly, the Court has clarified that judicial authority covers authorities
of a Member State which, although not necessarily judges or courts,
participate in the administration of criminal justice in that Member State.114
This broader understanding of judicial authority accommodates the diversity
of national systems of criminal justice115 and the wide range of scenarios
where judicial cooperation in criminal matters governed by EU law occurs.116
Thirdly, the issuing authority must be in a position to give assurances to the
executing judicial authority that there exist, in the issuing State, statutory rules
and an institutional framework capable of guaranteeing the independence of
the issuing authority in the exercise of the responsibilities flowing from the
EAW FD.117 The element of reassurance and cooperation confirms the picture
of an EAW built on the joint operation of mutual trust and sincere cooperation,
with judicial independence as a fundamental precondition.
Fourthly, the “issuing judicial authority” must be capable of exercising its
responsibilities objectively, taking into account all incriminatory and
exculpatory evidence, without being exposed to the risk that its
112. Case C-477/16, Ruslanas Kovalkovas, C:2016:861, para 44.
113. Case C-452/16 PPU, Krzystof Marek Poltorak, EU:C:2016:858; Case C-477/16,
Kovalkovas.
114. Case C-477/16, Kovalkovas, para 31.
115. E.g. public prosecutors in Italy are independent members of the judiciary.
116. There are instances, e.g. in the investigation phase or as far as exchange of evidence is
concerned, where public prosecutors are equally or more likely to be the main institutional actor
involved in the cooperation.
117. Joined Cases C-508 &/18 & 82/19 PPU,Minister for Justice and Equality v. OG and
PI, EU:C:2019:456, para 74.
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decision-making power be subject to external directions or instructions, in
particular from the executive.118
Fifthly, it is important to remember that the existence of a national arrest
warrant or other enforceable judicial decision,119 on which the EAW must be
based, is another condition of validity of the latter.120 With that in mind, the
ECJ has observed that the EAW system entails a dual level of protection: the
first level relates to the adoption of the national decision, such as a national
arrest warrant; whereas the second must be afforded when an EAW is
issued.121 The second level of protection – that related to the issuance of the
EAW – entails that the judicial authority competent to issue an EAW must
review observance of the conditions necessary for the issuing of the warrant,
and examine whether it is proportionate to issue that warrant.122 Such a level
of protection must be ensured even where the EAW is based on a national
decision delivered by a judge or a court.
Sixthly, where the law of the issuing Member State confers the competence
to issue an EAW on an authority which is not itself a court, the decision to
issue such an arrest warrant and the proportionality of such a decision must be
capable of being the subject, in the Member State, of court proceedings which
meet in full the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection.123 A
broader understanding of judicial authorities, capable of acting in a framework
of judicial cooperation based on mutual trust and automaticity, is thus
counterbalanced by a set of safeguards meant to ensure proper judicial
oversight.
Judicial independence is a precondition for the definition of judicial
authority. This is a fundamental component of the system of effective
protection that must be guaranteed in the context of EAW procedures.
Connected as they are, however, independence and the concept of judicial
authority, on the one hand, and effective judicial protection, on the other,
should not be collapsed together. In this sense, the existence of a judicial
remedy against the decision, taken by an authority other than a court to issue
an EAW, is not a condition for classification of that authority as an issuing
judicial authority within the meaning of Article 6(1) FD – as long as that
authority has institutional independence. The requirement of judicial
118. Case C-477/16, Kovalkovas, para 42.
119. This is understood as a measure adopted by a judicial authority to arrest a person
subject to criminal proceedings, with the objective of bringing that person before a court for the
purposes of fulfilling the acts of criminal procedure. See Case C-414/20 PPU, MM,
EU:C:2021:4, para 57.
120. EAW FD, Art. 8(1)(c).
121. Case C-241/15, Niculaie Aurel Bob-Dogi, EU:C:2016:385, para 56.
122. Case C-477/16, Kovalkovas, para 47.
123. Joined Cases C-508/18 & 82/19 PPU, OG and PI, para 75.
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oversight of a decision taken by a body that is not a court or tribunal does not
fall within the scope of the statutory rules and institutional framework of that
authority, but concerns the procedure for issuing such a warrant, which must
satisfy the requirement of effective judicial protection.124 That protection
must be in place in the issuing State and activated before execution of the
EAW: a national law providing for judicial review only after surrender would
not meet the requirements inherent in Article 47 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights.125
5.2. The variable degree of independence
These features show that the principles that have emerged from the analysis of
the EAW so far apply mutatis mutandis to the concept of judicial authority.
Five judgments on the concept of “judicial authority” were issued in 2019
alone. These preliminary rulings were mostly concerned with the
independence of national public prosecutor’s offices, and their capacity for
meeting the necessary requirements of issuing judicial authority.126 The saga
was opened by two judgments concerning the Prosecutor General of
Lithuania127 and that of Germany.128 As to the former, the ECJ observed that
it prepares the ground for the exercise of judicial power by the criminal courts
of that Member State. Therefore, it is capable of being regarded as
participating in the administration of criminal justice.129 In exercising the
powers conferred on it, the Prosecutor General of Lithuania must satisfy itself
that the requirements necessary to issue an EAW are met. The constitutional
framework of Lithuania guarantees the Prosecutor General of Lithuania the
benefit of that independence. This led the Court to the finding that that
authority is covered by Article 6(1) EAW FD. However, the ECJ took care to
clarify that the executing authority should determine whether a decision of the
Prosecutor General to issue an EAW may be the subject of court proceedings
which meet in full the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection.130
124. Joined Cases C-566 & 626/19 PPU, Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg
and Openbaar Ministerie v. JR and YC, EU:C:2019:1077, paras. 48 and 63.
125. Case C-648/20 PPU, PI, EU:C:2021:187, para 60.
126. One of them concerned EAWs issued for enforcement of judgments, and not directly
relevant for the present discussion. See Case C-627/19 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie v. ZB,
EU:C:2019:1079.
127. Case C-509/18,Minister for Justice and Equality v. PF, EU:C:2019:457.
128. Joined Cases C-508/18 & 82/19 PPU, OG and PI.
129. Case C-509/18, PF, EU:C:2019:457, para 42.
130. Ibid., para 56.
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The ECJ came to the opposite conclusion in the case of the German public
prosecutors. According to German Law, the German Minister for Justice has
an “external” power to issue instructions in the specific case to the public
prosecutor’s office, which in turn enables the Minister to have a direct
influence on a decision concerning the EAW.131 Though featuring safeguards
concerning dismissal of officials and modality of writing and notification of
the instructions, the exercise of the minister’s powers was not specifically
regulated.132 Therefore, the influence of the executive on the decision of
issuing of an EAW could not be wholly ruled out and the public prosecutor’s
office could not be considered a judicial authority under Article 6 EAW
FD.133
The picture has acquired further nuances with the assessment of the French
public prosecutor’s office which was found to satisfy the prerequisite of
judicial independence.134 That independence – enshrined in the constitution
and the criminal code – is jeopardized neither by the fact that the Ministry of
Justice can issue general policy instructions, nor by the fact that the judges
attached to the prosecutor’s office issuing the EAW must comply with
directions from hierarchically superior magistrates within that office. Public
prosecutors possess the quality of judicial authority, provided that they
demonstrate in particular (a) external independence which in turn can be
undermined (b) if the executive is empowered to provide instructions in the
specific case. While such an approach fails to take account of concerns about
internal independence – as the ECtHR understands it, namely pressure from
within the judiciary – the ECJ still requires judicial oversight offering
guarantees of effective protection. In the French legal system, an EAW is
based on a national warrant issued by a court (usually an investigative judge)
who also reviews the conditions for the issuance of the EAW and its
proportionality. Furthermore, the person can challenge the validity of the
decision at the basis of the EAW.
Judicial oversight (guarantee of effective judicial protection) “saves” the
validity of an EAW even if the issuing authority can be subject to instructions
from the executive in a specific case. The reasons for this emerge clearly from
131. Joined Cases C-508/18 & 82/19 PPU, OG and PI, paras. 76–77.
132. Ibid., paras. 81–83.
133. For Germany’s reaction to the judgment, see Ambos, “The German Public Prosecutor
as (no) judicial authority within the meaning of the EuropeanArrest Warrant:A case note on the
CJEU’s judgment in OG (C-508/18) and PI (C 82/19 PPU)”, 10 NJECL (2019), 406. See also
the note of Germany, available at <www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejnupload/News/WK-6666-20
19-INIT.PDF>. See also Eurojust and EJN joint document about the situation in the Member
States, available at <www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/EJN_RegistryDoc/EN/3079/98/0>.
134. Joined Cases C-566 & 626/19 PPU,Parquet général duGrand-Duché de Luxembourg.
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the ECJ’s judgment on the Austrian public prosecutor’s offices, which are
authorities tasked with issuing arrest warrants. They are hierarchically
subordinate to higher public prosecutor’s offices, which in turn are
subordinate to the Federal Minister for Justice. However, the warrants must be
endorsed by a court which carries out a review of the conditions and
proportionality. In the absence of such an endorsement, arrest warrants do not
produce legal effects and cannot be transmitted. In that context, the objective
and independent judicial review offsets the risk that the public prosecutor’s
office is subject, directly or indirectly, to directions or instructions in a
specific case from the executive.135 In a case concerning Sweden’s public
prosecutor’s office, moreover, the ECJ has recalled that Article 10 Directive
2013/48/EU – so-called Access to a Lawyer Directive – obliges the competent
authority in the executing State to inform the person concerned of their right
to appoint a lawyer in the issuing State.136
What if the national legislation of the issuing State does not provide for a
judicial remedy against the decision to issue an EAW taken by an authority
which, though in line with the requirements of independence set by the ECJ, is
not a court or tribunal? As mentioned above (5.1), the requirement of effective
protection is met on condition that the judicial review takes place in the
issuing State before surrender. Furthermore, the national court competent to
review the legality of the provisional detention post-surrender must be able to
review incidentally the legality of the EAW, and in particular the existence of
a national arrest warrant or any other enforceable judicial decision.137
Judicial oversight is equally important in the phase of execution of the
warrant. This is especially the case since “the intervention of the executing
judicial authority constitutes the sole level of protection provided for by [the
EAW FD]” to guarantee that, in executing the warrant, the appropriate
safeguards were afforded to the person concerned.138 Just like the issuing
judicial authority, the executing body in charge of executing an EAW must act
independently and exercise its responsibilities under a procedure which
complies with the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection.139
135. Case C-489/19 PPU, NJ, EU:C:2019:849.
136. Case C-625/19 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie v. XD, EU:C:2019:1078, para 55.
137. Case C-414/20 PPU,MM, para 74. However, a finding by that court that the EAW was
issued in the absence of a national arrest warrant and was therefore invalid, does not trigger an
automatic obligation to release the person placed in provisional detention after surrender to the
issuing State. It is for the referring court to decide, in line with its national law, what impact the
absence of such a national warrant has on the decision to hold the person in detention. See Case
C-414/20 PPU, MM, para 82.
138. Case C-510/19, AZ, EU:C:2020:953, para 53.
139. Ibid., para 70.
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5.3. A patchy legal framework or an emerging system of EU criminal
justice?
What are the consequences of this law in terms of judicial independence,
mutual trust and the functioning of the EAW? According to Böse, the case law
of the ECJ presents a series of incongruities that are difficult to reconcile with
one another.140 First, the ECJ includes public prosecutors in the concept of
judicial authorities and requires them to be independent, but has in the past
acknowledged they do not possess the necessary independence to raise a
question for a preliminary ruling.141 Second, the ECJ’s reasoning seems to
imply that only courts and tribunals are endowed with the requirements to
issue EAWs, while mutual recognition instruments in criminal law generally
treat public prosecutors as judicial authority. Furthermore, the right to a fair
trial, to a legal remedy and the right to liberty do not require ex ante judicial
oversight.142 Third, the Court overemphasizes the importance of external
independence at the expense of impartiality and independence from within the
judiciary.
While those concerns are understandable, the present author argues that the
apparent inconsistency softens once these judgments are put in perspective.
There is no doubt that “judicial authority” encompasses courts and tribunals
as well as public prosecutors. However, independence is a complex concept
and consists of different dimensions. Considering the way prosecution
services are organized and their constitutional role, complete internal
independence and impartiality cannot be realistically expected. The ECtHR’s
case law itself shows that the protection offered by internal independence
focuses on courts and tribunals,143 and that the public prosecutor’s office is not
bound by the obligations of independence and impartiality that Article 6
imposes on a “tribunal”144 unless they are acting as judicial officers in charge
of review under Article 5(3) ECHR145 – which is different from issuing an
EAW.
The ECJ’s interpretation is precisely geared towards systemic coherence.
External independence is the trait d’union that keeps courts, tribunals and
140. See Böse, “The European Arrest Warrant and the independence of public prosecutors:
OG & PI, PF, JR & YC”, 57 CML Rev. (2020), in particular at 1269, 1275.
141. Case C-74/95, Criminal proceedings against X, EU:C:1996:491, paras. 19–20.
142. Case C-583/13 P, Deutsche Bahn AG v. European Commission, EU:C:2015:404,
paras. 46–48.
143. Sillen, “The concept of ‘internal judicial independence’ in the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights”, 15 EuConst (2019), 104–133.
144. ECtHR, Thiam v. France, Appl. No. 80018/12, judgment of 18 Jan. 2019, para 71.
145. ECtHR, Pantea v. Romania, Appl. No. 33343/96, judgment of 3 March 2003, paras.
236–239.
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public prosecutors under the same umbrella (judicial authority) while at the
same time ensuring a certain consistency across EU criminal law. In a polity
like the EU, where State-based organization of the justice systems goes hand
in hand with a mechanism of surrender built on automaticity, the balance
between ground rules and flexibility is key. The ECJ is not restricting the
concept of issuing judicial authority to courts and tribunals, but is requiring a
minimum degree of judicial supervision; hence the requirement that the
“decision on issuing a warrant” is taken by a judicial authority that meets the
requirements inherent in effective judicial protection, which suggests the
overseeing nature of the task.146 A requirement that only a completely
independent public prosecutor can validly issue EAWs would raise concerns
in terms of democratic accountability and rule of law,147 but this is not the
ECJ’s position.
In a nutshell, at least in this case, the Court is upholding a long-standing
argument haunting the coming into being and development of EU criminal
justice: an efficient system of transnational law enforcement requires
effective guarantees for the individual. Mutual trust cannot be a mere leap of
faith. This reflects the conceptual trajectory followed by the ECJ in refining
mutual trust over the years, a presumption that has strong foundations,
reinforced by common standards (see, for instance, the reference to theAccess
to a Lawyer Directive in the above-mentioned case on the Swedish public
prosecutor’s office) and safeguards.
Far-reaching effects of this case law on mutual recognition in criminal
matters are generally not easy to predict. Recent developments, however,
reveal a certain degree of flexibility in the interpretation of judicial authority,
depending on the right at stake. In the context of the European Investigation
Order (EIO) Directive,148 a measure establishing a framework for mutual
recognition of investigative measures and exchange of evidence, it has been
found that public prosecutors are indeed issuing judicial authorities even if
they are exposed to the risk of being subject to instruction in the specific
case.149 Firstly, Article 2(c)(i) of the Directive explicitly includes public
prosecutors in the list of authorities that can issue a EIO – unlike the EAW FD.
Secondly, the Directive lays down a series of procedural guarantees that have
no equivalent in the EAW FD.150 The structural differences between the EAW
and EIO help make sense of the variable understanding of judicial authority.
The EIO Directive is a post-Lisbon instrument of judicial cooperation in
146. Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, para 56.
147. See Böse, op. cit. supra note 138, 1277, and Ambos, op. cit. supra note 131, 405.
148. Directive 2014/41/EU, O.J. 2014, L 130/1.
149. Case C-584/19, Staatsanwaltschaft Wien v. A and others, EU:C:2020:587.
150. See in particular Directive 2014/41/EU, Arts. 2(d), 6(1), 6(3), 10, 11(1)(f), and 14(1).
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criminal matters and its built-in safeguards reveal a higher level of “maturity”.
Furthermore, it concerns a phase of criminal proceedings where the law
enforcement authorities and prosecution offices are usually more involved.
Most importantly, it does not entail – unlike the EAW – deprivation of liberty
of the person concerned for around 70 days, if the time limits of the FD are
complied with.
The law is therefore not as irrational as it might look prima facie, although
questions remain on the table involving the interplay amongst judicial
independence, sincere cooperation and mutual trust in the unfolding of the
EAW mechanism. We have seen that judicial supervision has the salvific
capacity to render the EAW a “judicial decision” under Article 1(1) FD, even
if it originates from a body that in itself lacks the requirements of “issuing
judicial authority”.
Does the Court approach judicial independence in the context of judicial
authority differently, as compared for example to the exceptional
circumstances doctrine?The answer is in the negative, although there seems to
be some variety in the degree of independence that is required of the issuing
authority. The issuing authority and the trying court or tribunal in the issuing
State post-surrender are subject to different standards because they perform
different tasks. The absence of impartiality does not prevent the prosecutor
from meeting the requirements of Article 6(1) FD, but there must be fully
independent – internally and externally – judicial supervision in the issuing
and executing States. The same level of (full) independence is, however,
required of the trying court, on the one hand, and the judicial authorities
supervising the EAW procedures in the issuing and executing States, on the
other hand.
So far, the compatibility of these supervising bodies in the Member States
with the principles established in the case law has not been challenged. This
leads to the second question: if the designated (issuing, rather than
supervising) authority in a Member State falls short of the standards set by the
ECJ and its EAWs are therefore invalid, would the ECJ’s case law on judicial
authority be de facto suspending the EAW towards that State?151 In this
regard, it is important to recall the distinction drawn by the Court between
deficiencies in judicial independence caused by the statutory rules and
institutional framework, on the one hand, and systemic deficiencies, on the
other. The former can occasion the invalidity of all the EAWs issued by the
entrusted authority in the State in question, whereas the latter must be dealt
151. See Mancano, “European Arrest Warrant and independence of the judiciary.
Evolution or revolution?”, Diritti Comparati, 2 Sept. 2019, available at <www.diritticomparati
.it/european-arrest-warrant-independence-judiciary-evolution-revolution/>; Böse, op. cit.
supra note 138, 1279.
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with in the context of the exceptional circumstances doctrine.152 Furthermore,
what would happen if the deficiencies in the statutory rules and institutional
framework affected the supervising body in a Member State?
In both cases, a legally sound course of action would see the executing
court, pursuant to Article 15(2) FD and 4(3) TEU, act as follows. Firstly, it
should exchange information with the issuing State. The latter must, indeed,
provide reassurance as to the existence of statutory rules and an institutional
framework capable of guaranteeing the independence of the issuing authority.
Should it emerge that the issuing State law does not clearly meet the standards
set by the ECJ, a preliminary reference should be sent to the ECJ. If the latter
finds “against” the issuing State, the ECJ could declare that Articles 1(1) and
6(1) FD prevent a national law of that kind, thus obliging the issuing State to
adjust its legislation to the EU standards – and possibly offering an
interpretation whereby the EAWs already issued remain temporarily valid,
pending retrospective judicial validation, as happened in Germany. We have
also seen the ECJ acting with urgency by means of interim measures.153 This
would constitute another avenue – jointly with the preliminary ruling – to
ensure (or at least push for) compliance with EU law without violating
institutional prerogatives and possibly breaching horizontal sincere
cooperation under Article 13(2) TEU. Should the Court, instead, provide the
executing court with a less prescriptive answer and leave discretion in the
assessment of the independence of the issuing authority, the executing court
might have to apply the exceptional circumstances doctrine and approach
these “reassurances”, as outlined, in that context: namely, carrying out an
overall assessment of the sincerity of the cooperation and trustworthiness of
the issuing authority, by relying on specific materials on the basis of a
probability assessment.
6. Conclusion
Since its introduction, the EAW has been the catalyst of important
developments for the EU legal order. This is not particularly surprising,
considering the significant innovation that it brought about to inter-State
152. Joined Cases C-354 & 412/20 PPU, L and P, paras. 47–51. The present author is aware
that such a distinction between systemic deficiencies and statutory rules, especially in relation
to judicial independence, might be prone to interpretative controversy. In fact, this might well
be one of the next key aspects of development in the judicial dialogue between the ECJ and
national courts in this area.
153. See Sarmiento, “Interim revolutions: The CJEU gives its first interim measures ruling
on the rule of law in Poland”, available at <eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/10/interim-
revolutions-cjeu-gives-its.html>.
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criminal matters. The EAW is an essential line of defence for the safe exercise
of free movement. It is built through an automatic mechanism of surrender
based on the presumption that, save in exceptional circumstances, the States
involved in cooperation respect fundamental rights.
The systemic assessment of the EAW carried out in this article has shed
light on some of its defining traits. First and foremost, mutual trust is part of
a network of general principles, and rests primarily on Article 4(3) TEU. The
conceptual roots of mutual trust, firmly anchored in sincere cooperation, have
practical consequences insofar as the former cannot operate without the latter.
This is apparent when mutual trust – the presumption that Member States
comply with fundamental rights save in exceptional circumstances – is
applied to a system of judicial cooperation for transnational surrender based
on automaticity. That cooperation involves the issuing and the executing
authorities as well as the ECJ as the designed “interpretative dispute
settlement body”. Judicial independence is the cornerstone of the sincere
cooperation-mutual trust structure. This concerns the independence of the
actors of cooperation involved in the EAW procedures as well as the bodies in
charge of proceedings in the issuing State post-surrender.
In that context, the legal regime of exceptions to execution of an EAW is the
key to better understanding its identity. The FD was adopted at a time when no
Member State was expecting a systemic backsliding in fundamental aspects
of the rule of law such as judicial independence. That also explains why, for
almost 15 years, the mandatory and optional grounds for refusal embedded in
the FD were considered the only possible exceptions to execution. The nature
of those exceptions and the evolving interpretation of the ECJ, however, have
been revelatory. Those grounds do address most fundamental rights concerns
that might accidentally arise during an EAW procedure, but (nearly) always on
the assumption that justice is being done and that (an undefined concept of)
impunity is generally avoided.
Nonetheless, scenarios may materialize where the balance between
complying with fundamental rights and pursuing justice (understood strictly
as completion of criminal proceedings) is harder to achieve. This is where the
exceptional circumstances doctrine comes into play, also referred to as the
fundamental rights exception. The doctrine, developed with regard to
inhumane treatment and the right to an independent tribunal, consists of a
two-step test: (1) systemic deficiencies affecting the right at stake in the
issuing State are liable to (2) affect the specific situation of the person subject
to the EAW. The rebuttal of the presumption of mutual trust and refusal of
execution of the EAW, to which the doctrine is geared, requires that a real risk
of violation in the issuing State is proved. That standard, it is believed, requires
a moderate level of risk. This, in turn, provides the executing courts with a
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certain degree of flexibility, when assessing the factual circumstances
underlying the EAW brought before them. In the application of the test, the
gathering of materials on the part of the executing authority, to be pursued also
with the assistance of the issuing authority, is an essential part of the process.
Independence and sincere cooperation are, once again, preconditions for the
functioning of the framework. The issuing authority must provide the
information promptly and accurately, while the executing authority must
request the additional elements necessary to take a decision on the EAW,
implement the test properly, and pose a question to the ECJ in case of
interpretative doubts. For cooperation to be deemed sincere, however, the
judicial authorities involved must at the very least be independent.
The assessment of independence in the context of the exceptional
circumstances doctrine focuses primarily on the court or tribunal with
jurisdiction over the proceedings for which the EAW was issued, and entails
an evaluation of both its independence and impartiality. However, the
independence of the issuing authority is of fundamental importance too. In
this context, the emphasis is particularly on (a) independence of the issuing
authority – which could be, in the case of the EAW, a public prosecutor as well
– from the executive, and (b) the requirement of fully independent judicial
supervision throughout the EAW procedures. These two conditions must be
guaranteed by the relevant statutory rules, in the absence of which the EAW is
invalid and must not be executed. The reassurances that must be given in this
respect by the issuing authorities bring up, once again, the role of the sincerity
of cooperation which can exist only when no interest other than the
application of the rule of law is involved.
While plenty of important questions remain on the table, the developments
discussed in this paper reveal the emergence of a very articulated set of
principles underpinning an increasingly integrated EU system of criminal
justice.
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